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SELECTING AN ANALOGOUS STATE LIMITATIONS
STATUTE IN RECONSTRUCTION CIVIL
RIGHTS ACTS CLAIMS:
THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S RESOLUTION*
MARK D. JARMIEt

The failure of Congress to enact a statutory time-bar for bringing suits
under the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts has encouraged the rapid
escalation of suits asserting federal civil rights claims.' Rather than allowing such suits an open-ended filing period, the Supreme Court has
directed that federal courts borrow the state statute of limitations governing analogous causes of action.' That vague instruction has caused the
various federal circuit courts to adopt a wide range of limitations periods
for suits brought under the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts. 3 Of greater
concern, however, are the disparate methods that the circuits have used
to derive the applicable limitations period.
The Tenth Circuit recently considered the issue en banc4 in order to
quell the controversy surrounding its apparently conflicting statutory selections. 5 It determined that federal civil rights causes of action have no
*The author would like to express his sincere thanks to Hon. Oliver Seth, Chief Judge, United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, for his guidance and encouragement of this Article.
This Article does not necessarily reflect his views or those of the United States Department of Justice.
tB.S.F.S., J.D., Georgetown University. Assistant United States Attorney for the District of New
Mexico. Former Clerk, Hon. Oliver Seth, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit.
1. The civil rights statutes pertinent to this Article, the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts, are 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144); 42
U.S.C. § 1982 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27); 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13); 42
U.S.C. § 1985 (1976) (originally enacted as Acts of July 31, 1861, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 284, and April
20, 1871, ch. 22, §2, 17 Stat. 13); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (originally enacted as Acts of April
9, 1866, ch. 31, §3, 14 Stat. 27, and May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 144).
Congress enacted limitations periods for actions brought under the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and
1968, see 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-5, 3610, 3612(a) (1976). Consequently, those statutes are beyond
the scope of this Article.
2. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483 (1980).
3. There are well over 200 reported circuit court published opinions addressing the issue of the
appropriate statute of limitations for suits brought under the Act. See passim. This Article does not
attempt to review the plethora of unpublished circuit and district court opinions and orders on the
subject.
4. Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc), was the lead opinion of a broad
battery of § 1983 statute of limitations cases considered simultaneously by the en banc court in its
October 1983 term. The others were Abbitt v. Franklin, 731 F.2d 661 (10th Cir. 1984); Pike v. City
of Mission, 731 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1984); Jackson v. City of Bloomfield, 731 F.2d 652 (10th Cir.
1984); Cowdrey v. City of Eastborough, 730 F.2d 1376 (10th Cir. 1984); McKay v. Hammock, 730
F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984); Mismash v. Murray City, 730 F.2d 1366 (10th Cir. 1984); and Hamilton
v. City of Overland Park, 730 F.2d 613 (10th Cir. 1984).
5. See infra notes 179-91 and accompanying text.
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common-law parallel 6 and that their most appropriate analogy was to state
limitations governing delictual actions.7 The circuit's opinion in Garcia
v. Wilson' restores durational certainty to civil rights claims brought within
the court's jurisdiction. The decision also is important because it is the
first appellate case to attempt to harmonize its views with those of all of
the other circuits.
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Garcia.' The Court
has squarely before it the issue of the most appropriate limitations period
for causes of action arising under the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts.
The issue is certainly ripe for review; the Court has declined to address
the issue on certiorari no fewer than thirty-one times previously. ' While
the Court may not be able to select a single sort of statute due to the
extant diversity in states' limitations catalogues, it can devise an analytical
approach to resolve the controversy that has long plagued the issue.
This Article will first address the policies involved in selecting an
appropriate state analogy to federal civil rights claims. It will then examine
the various analytical approaches utilized to determine the applicable
limitations periods and will identify the method that best serves the policies of the selection process. Next, the analogies drawn by the several
circuits will be surveyed. Finally, this Article will examine the Tenth
Circuit's opinion in Garcia, which employed the preferable analytical
approach earlier identified. The purpose of this Article is not, therefore,
to dictate a statutory analogy. Rather, this Article will suggest an approach
by which the analogy can be properly derived.
I. POLICIES UNDERLYING THE CHOICE OF AN
ANALOGOUS STATE STATUTE
A. The Nature and Purpose of the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts
The Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts are codified as Sections 1981,
1982, and 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code. Sections 1981 and
6. Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 649-(10th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
7. Id. at 651. The term "delictual actions" refers to those suits invoking state statutes governing
injuries to the broad rights of another. Those statutes can be contrasted with state tort statutes which
refer to specific common-law torts. See infra notes 64-106 and accompanying text.
8. 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
9. Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3235 (U.S. Oct.
1, 1984) (No. 83-2146). The questions presented are:
1) When action for deprivation of constitutional rights is brought in federal court
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, may federal court disregard limitations period held applicable by state's highest court to identical action brought in state court under § 1983,
where limitations period applied in state court is neither too short nor inconsistent
with Constitution and federal laws? 2) If federal court may disregard limitations
period applied by state's highest court to § 1983 actions filed in state court, what
are characteristics of § 1983 action that federal court must consider in identifying
most closely analogous cause of action and its applicable statute of limitations, as
required under Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980), and Johnson
v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975)?
10. See infra notes 107-78 and accompanying text.
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1982 codify certain of the rights secured by the thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution. Section 1981 protects the rights to make
and to enforce contracts and to enjoy the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings provided for the security of persons and property. "
Section 1982 secures the right to convey, inherit, and purchase real and
personal property.' 2 Section 1983 grants a civil cause of action against
those who, under color of state law, deprive a person of any right,
privilege, or immunity secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the
United States. 13
The Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts are procedural vehicles enabling
the redress of violations of an individual's civil rights. They do not, by
themselves, create any substantive rights.' 4 As procedural vehicles though,
they do not merely confer concurrent jurisdiction on federal courts to
entertain common law tort claims against state officials. While state law
may provide an adequate remedy in tort to a person whose civil rights
have been transgressed, the aggrieved party may still seek relief in federal
court. '" The underlying rationale is seductively simple: "[A] deprivation
of a constitutional right is significantly different from and more serious
than a violation of a state right and therefore deserves a different remedy
even though the same act may constitute both a state tort and the deprivation of a constitutional right."' 6
The federal policies underlying the three statutes are embodied in their
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976) provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District
of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
14. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979) (§ 1983); District of
Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
15. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), reaffirmed
the Monroe holding. Parratt carefully conscribes the scope of § 1983 to genuinely constitutional
claims. To do otherwise "would make of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be
superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States." Parratt,451 U.S.
at 544 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
16. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 196 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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legislative precursors, the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts. 7 The Acts
were the legislative reaction to the racially inspired violence of the postbellum South. While envisioned as a means by which the former black
slave population could air claims arising under the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, 18 the Acts cannot be read so narrowly. 9 The sweeping
grant to all citizens of the "full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens" 2 and the broad protection against the deprivation under color
of state law of any right or privilege secured by the Constitution or federal
law provided by the Acts" cannot be grudgingly interpreted. 2
B. Policies Underlying the Selection of a Statute of Limitations in
Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts Claims
Congress did not enact a limitation period for actions brought under
the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts. Such voids, while unfortunate, are
hardly uncommon.23 When Congress creates a cause of action without
specifying the period within which it may be asserted, the Supreme Court
17. Sections 1981 and 1982 were spawned by § 1 of the Civi-l-Rights Act of 1866 which provided:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power,
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United
States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other,
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
Section 1983 was enacted as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). The
two acts comprise the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts.
18. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Santistevan v. Loveridge, 732 F.2d 116 (10th Cir.
1984).
19. The "principal policies" of § 1983 are deterrence of future unlawful conduct and compensation. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 593 (1978).
20. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
21. As the Court noted in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 171, the purpose of the Reconstruction
Civil Rights Acts, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Acts, is plain from the title of the legislation,
"An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, and for other Purposes." 17 Stat. 13. The Monroe Court discussed three specific purposes
of the Act" first, to override racially invidious state legislation; second, to provide a remedy where
state law was inadequate; and third, to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though
adequate in theory, was unavailable in practice. 365 U.S. at 173-74.
22. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes
must be accorded a "sweep as broad as [their language]." See, e.g., United States v. Price, 383
U.S. 787, 801 (1966).
23. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483 (1980).
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typically borrows the local law of limitations.2" The Court has dictated
that similar borrowing occur in actions brought under the Reconstruction
Civil Rights Acts, instructing federal courts to choose the state law of
limitations "governing an analogous cause of action ' 25 or "the most
appropriate [period] provided by state law." 26 Courts have justified such
borrowing as the appropriate interpretation of Congressional intent 27 or
as commanded by statute.28
Universal adoption of the borrowing approach has not, however, resulted in a judicial consensus as to which state statute it is most appropriate
to select. The Supreme Court has in the past provided little guidance to
the selection process beyond its oblique direction that federal courts apply
24. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (Civil Rights Act of 1866); Auto Workers
v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966) (Labor Management Relations Act); McAllister v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958) (Jones Act); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947)
(National Bank Act); O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318 (1914) (Civil Rights Act of 1871); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906) (Sherman Act); Campbell v.
Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895) (Patent Act); McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830)
(sale of federal lands.)
25. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 483-84.
26. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975).
27. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946). Accord Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160
(1976).
28. Statutory authority for the borrowing of state limitations periods is found in both the Rules
of Decision Act and in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). The Rules of Decision Act provides that "[tihe
laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of
Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the
courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 92
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976)). The Act was first applied to require the utilization of the
state statute of limitations in McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830), a case involving
the timeliness of a claim for the failure to record land purchase applications. O'Sullivan v. Felix,
233 U.S. 318 (1914) (action under § 1983 and § 1985 based on conspiracy to deprive blacks of
voting rights), applied the Act to the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts.
Recent cases have used § 1988 as the theoretical underpinning for the borrowing of state statutes
of limitation. See Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 103 S. Ct. 2611 (1983); Board of Regents v. Tomanio,
446 U.S. 478 (1980); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1977); Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975). Section 1988 provides:
The jurisdiction in civil . . . matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions of this [chapter] . . . shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with
the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same
into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient
in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against
law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes
of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil . . . cause is held,
so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition
of the cause. ...
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). While analytically criticized as elusive, see Comment, Statutory Time
Limitations on Back Pay Recovery in Section 1981 and 1983 Employment DiscriminationSuits, 29
Emory L.J. 437,445 n.43 (1980), § 1988, coupled with the Rules of Decision Act, has so frequently
served as a predicate for the borrowing of state statutes that the debate is of more interest to scholars
than to jurists. See Baker v. F & F Investment, 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1970).
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the most analogous state statute. The Court on several occasions has
sidestepped the opportunity either to detail an analytical approach to
statutory selection or to announce its preference as to the type of state
statute to which lower courts should draw their analogy.29
What guidance the Court has given lower courts has served to encourage
the protection of federal interests, rather than to delineate an analytical
approach. The Court has proscribed federal courts from selecting statutes
of limitation which would "frustrate or interfere with the implementation
of national policies," 3 or which would undermine the policies underlying
the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts. 3
The Supreme Court has defined few other parameters for the selection
process. In response, lower courts have developed a set of guidelines
derived from the oblique dicta of the Court and from the common law.
Initially, they have recognized a duty not to select a state limitations
period so short as to impinge upon the broad remedial policies underlying
the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts." The chosen statute must also
29. The Court has ratified both lower court selections of a statute to recover upon a liability
created by statute, see Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980), and of general tort
statutes, see Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 103 S. Ct. 2611 (1983) (accepting First Circuit's selection
of P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5298(2)); Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 (1981) (same); Johnson
v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (limited grant of certiorari foreclosed consideration
of statutes other than Sixth Circuit's choice of Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-304).
Exemplary of the Court's elusory arabesque is Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). There,
two black children brought suit under § 1981 claiming that they had been denied admission to private
schools in Virginia because of the schools' policy of denying admission to blacks. Id. at 164. The
district court and the Fourth Circuit held that a two-year statute of limitations governing personal
injuries, Va. Code Ann. §8-24 (1957), barred the children's claims for damages. Id. at 180. After
granting the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief, id. at 179, the Supreme Court turned to the
plaintiffs' claims for damages. The plaintiffs had asserted two related arguments in favor of their
damages claims. First, they agreed that the discrimination did not cause actual physical injury
contemplated by the terms of the Virginia statute. Second, they referred the Court to a longer
residuary statute governing "[e]very personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed."
Va. Code Ann. § 8-24 (1957). Rather than declaring that civil rights claims were indeed analogous
to personal injuries or finding that physical injuries were the sole type of injury contemplated by
the Virginia statute, the Court demurred to the Fourth Circuit's choice:
We are not disposed to displace the considered judgment of the Court of Appeals
on an issue whose resolution is so heavily contingent upon an analysis of state
law, particularly when the established rule has been relied upon and applied in
numerous suits filed in the Federal District Courts in Virginia.
Id. at 181.
30. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977) (Title VII actions).
31. Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S. Ct. 2924, 2930 (1984) ("A state law is not 'appropriate' if it fails
to take into account . . . policies that are analogous to the goals of the Civil Rights Acts."); Johnson
v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975); Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,
383 U.S. 696, 701 (1966); Board of County Commissioners v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 352
(1939).
32. Though the lower courts have recognized that certain limitations might be insufficient to
enable civil rights plaintiffs to exercise their rights under § 1981 and § 1983, there has been little
agreement as to what the durational threshold must be. See, e.g., Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654
F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982) (180 days too short); Warner v. Perrino,
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promote the policies of repose for which limitations periods are designed.33 The policies of repose, however, are broader than the mere
prevention of surprise through the revival of state claims. 3 A correlative
purpose of statutes of limitations is to provide uniform treatment of legally
similar claims within each state. 5 Simply, a litigant should be able to
rely upon a court's previous choice of a state limitations statute when the
court is later presented with an analogous claim.36 Finally, the statute
selection should not vary with the legal status of the defendant."
Lower federal courts, for the most part, however, have failed to incorporate expressly these policy concerns in their selection of analogous
state statutes. As a result of their failure, they have ignored the essential
cornerstone for uniform analysis of the issue. This Article next utilizes
those policy objectives to identify the preferable analytical approach by
which courts can make the selection of an analogous statute.
II. APPROACHES TO DERIVING AN ANALOGOUS STATE STATUTE
A court's analytical approach has some potential to dictate the limitations analogy the court will draw. Drawing differing analogies, however,
585 F.2d 171 (6th Cir. 1978) (180 days sufficient); Johnson v. Davis, 582 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1978)
(one year insufficient). The Supreme Court has accepted lower court choices of periods as short as
one year. See Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 103 S. Ct. 2611 (1983); Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S.
6 (1981); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975). A six-month statutory analogy,
however, has been declared insufficient to prepare for the practicalities of litigation. Burnett v.
Grattan, 104 S. Ct. 2924, 2930 (1984).
33. See, e.g., Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1961).
34. The oft-quoted language of Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S.
342 (1944), enunciates the traditional purposes of repose:
Statutes of limitation ... are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence
has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory
is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice
to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale
claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.
Id. at 348-49.
35. See King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 333 U.S. 153, 157 (1948).
36. The haphazard selection of widely divergent statutes by many lower federal courts has engendered considerable confusion among practitioners. The variations exist not only between circuits
but often within a circuit. See infra notes 107-78 and accompanying text. One commentator has
ascribed the confusion to four main factors: first, the time, length, and application of statutory
limitations vary with each state's unique statutory scheme; second, the application of different statutes
has been encouraged by distinguishable fact situations; third, the failure of many courts to specify
which of several types of limitations, all equal in length, was chosen has hindered analytical clarity;
and fourth, courts have applied different statutes to actions arising under § 1981 and § 1982 than to
those arising under § 1983 and § 1985. Note, FederalBorrowing of Arkansas Statutes of Limitations
in Enforcement of the Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes, 31 Ark. L. Rev. 692, 697-98 (1978).
37. The official position of the defendant can determine the applicable limitations period as well
as his potential immunity to suit. In New Mexico, for example, suits against city officials for breach
of contract are limited to three years, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-24 (1978), but suits upon written
contracts under ordinary circumstances are governed by a six-year limitations period, id. § 37-1-3
(1978). See also Garcia v. University of Kansas, 702 F.2d 849, 850 (10th Cir. 1983).
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does not necessarily mean that the state statute selected will be different.
In choosing the appropriate state statute, the courts are necessarily limited
by the statutes encompassed within the state's catalogue of limitations,
as well as by the state legislature's analytical approach to the creation of
the catalogue. No model for the selection of state limitations periods can
apply with equal force to all states due to the extant diversity in statutory
schema. The generalizations made here advance an abstract solution; its
relevance to a given state is wholly dependent upon the language employed in the state's statutory limitations catalogue.
A. Analytical Approaches
Behind the failure of lower federal courts to achieve a consensus on
statutory selection is a disagreement on the analytical methodology by
which the choice is to be made. One approach utilized, designated as
Type I, determines the "essential nature" of the federal claim and then
selects from state law the "limitation period [which] would be applicable
to a state claim of the same general category." 3 8 For example, if in a
section 1981 employment discrimination claim a court were to determine
that the essential nature of the federal claim was drawn from the underlying employment contract, then Type I reasoning might lead the court
to apply the state limitations period applicable to contracts.
A second approach, designated as Type II, suggests that the choice of
a particular statute of limitations is dependent on "how a state court
applying state law would categorize the action for relief."3 9 When a
federal court utilizes Type II analysis, it initially analyzes the facts supporting the federal claim. Next, the court surveys state cases to determine
how the state's courts have categorized such claims on similar facts.
Finally, it selects the state limitations statute which is applicable to claims
of that category.
A third approach, designated as Type III, was first adopted in the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Garcia v. University of Kansas.4" The approach
focuses on the cause of action asserted under the Reconstruction Civil
Rights Acts 4 rather than on the "essential nature of the federal claim." 4 2
The University of Kansas court characterized all causes of action under
sections 1981 and 1983 similarly: they were defined as violations of the
plaintiff's constitutional rights.4 3 Under this approach the cause of action
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See, e.g., Ingram v. Steven Robert Corp., 547 F.2d 1260, 1261 (5th Cir. 1977).
Id.
702 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1983).
Id.
See Ingram v. Steven Robert Corp., 547 F.2d 1260, 1261 (5th Cir. 1977).
702 F.2d at 850.

Winter 1985]

RECONSTRUCTION

CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS CLAIMS

and the claim are discrete. The former describes the rights violated, the
latter describes the manner in which the rights were violated.4' Thus,
while a racially inspired assault might prompt a civil rights claim, the
cause of action under the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts is one for the
transgression of. the plaintiff's constitutional rights.45 Under a Type III
approach, the sole task of the court is to determine which of a state's
statutes is most nearly analogous to an abridgement of the plaintiff's
constitutional rights. 6
B. Statutory Selection
Lower federal courts have usually chosen one of the following types
of limitations to govern civil rights claims: (1) provisions applicable to
various types of common law tort or contract actions; (2) general ex
delicto provisions governing injuries to the person or to the rights of the
person; (3) provisions governing liabilities created by statute; and (4)
residuary limitations provisions applicable to actions governed by no other
state limitations period.4 7 The selection of the provisions applicable to
common law tort or contract actions is the usual result of Type I or Type
II analysis. Type III analysis generally yields one of the three remaining4
types of limitations statutes. Prior to its decision in Garcia v. Wilson,
the Tenth Circuit had applied each type of statute.4 9
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. The approach finds considerable support in Supreme Court decisions. In Board of Regents
v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980), the Court instructed lower courts to borrow "the state law of
limitations governing an analogous cause of action." Id. at 483-84. The Tomanio Court discussed
neither the manner in which the rights were violated nor the notion that federal courts should categorize
the action as would a state court. In Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979),
the Court declared that § 1983 "served only to ensure that an individual had a cause of action for
violations of the Constitution." Id. at 617. Similarly, in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421
U.S. 454 (1975), the Court stated that "considerations of state law may be displaced where their
application would be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of action under
consideration." Id. at 465. See Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 706-07
(1966). From these decisions, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the Court had clearly indicated "that
the nature of the cause of action is the fundamental consideration." Garcia v. University of Kansas,
702 F.2d at 850.
47. A similar grouping was suggested in Comment, Statutes ofLimitations in FederalCivil Rights
Litigation, 1976 Ariz. St. L.J. 97, 116.
The four types of statutes enumerated above are not exhaustive. Occasionally, courts will apply
a limitations provision found in a state's civil rights statute. See, e.g., Carter v. Supermarkets Gen.
Corp., 684 F.2d 187 (1st Cir. 1982) (applying Mass Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151B, § 5 (West 1982));
Warner v. Perrino, 585 F.2d 171 (6th Cir. 1978) (applying Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2305.09(D),
4112.01-4112.99, 4112.02(H)(I), 4112.05, 4112.051(A) (Page 1954)); Warner v. Norman Realty
Co., 513 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1975) (applying Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 20-105 to 20-125 (1943)). For
purposes of this Article, such statutes are considered as ex delicto, as they speak in terms of a duty
not to discriminate. See infra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
48. 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
49. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
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1. Federal Civil Rights Actions as State Claims: The Result of
Type I Reasoning
The Type I approach will logically result in a tort or contract analogy.
The decisions which draw on contract or tort analogies look to the facts
pled in the plaintiff's claim. The facts then lead immediately to a state
law analogy. The uniquely federal nature of the cause of action is not a
part of the analytical equation and becomes of little import.5 0
The Tenth Circuit case of Zuniga v. AMFAC Foods5 illustrates the
analytical process of the Type I approach. In Zuniga, the plaintiff alleged
that his employer refused him "bumping rights" which would have prevented the termination of his employment.5 2 The plaintiff claimed the
refusal was based on his national origin in violation of section 1981."
The court stated that it was necessary to analyze critically the particular
allegations of the claim underlying the section 1981 action and then to
determine if there was a comparable state analogue." The court determined that the appropriate analogy was to either a tort or a breach of
contract claim and applied the state statute governing both such claims."
The Zuniga court's Type I reasoning fundamentally mischaracterized
the claim because it assumed the existence of a comparable state analogue.
Because no state statute embodies the uniquely federal concerns of the
Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts,56 Type I reasoning inherently draws a
faulty analogy. The analogy derived by Type I reasoning is to state concerns which uniformly deal with common law torts and contracts, rather
than the procedural remedy anticipated by the Acts.57
2. Federal Courts as State Courts Applying State Law: The Result
of Type II Reasoning
Type II reasoning even more clearly eschews federal interests. State
courts applying state law simply have no incentive to consider federal
interests." Because state law is frequently designed to protect commonlaw rights, reversion to the underlying tort or contract appears probable
under the Type II approach.
50. Ingram v. Steven Robert Corp., 547 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1977).
51. 580 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1978).
52. Id. at 381.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 383-84.
55. Id. at 387. Employing a common-law analogy to a civil rights claim clearly troubled the
court. "There is no doubt that there are some differences between a civil rights claim created by
section 1981 and contract and tort claims, but we cannot say that a comparable claim is not found
in the contract and tort causes of action." Id. at 386.
56. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584
(1978).
57. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
58. Id.
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The analysis is not dissimilar if the state in which the action arises has
a tort claims statute. Illustrative is the decision of the New Mexico Supreme Court in DeVargas v. State ex rel. New Mexico Department of
Corrections.5 9 There, a state prisoner filed a section 1983 action in state
court, charging that certain prison guards and officials violated his civil
rights by beating him and confining him in an unsanitary segregation cell.
The defendants argued that the timebar imposed by the state's Tort Claims
Act' should be controlling and moved to dismiss on the grounds that the
statute of limitations had run. The New Mexico courts agreed, holding
that the state Tort Claims Act provided for liability analogous to that of
section 1983, as the Tort Claims Act would waive the immunity of law
enforcement officers acting within the scope of their duties. 6
The DeVargas holding is flawed on two counts. First, it is relevant
only to a narrow range of potential claims arising under the Reconstruction
Civil Rights Acts. The New Mexico Tort Claims Act waives the liability
of certain government officials for specified acts.62 The scope of potential
liability under section 1983 is much broader. The DeVargas holding,
therefore, fails to encompass the wide spectrum of state officials and
activities which are not covered by the New Mexico Tort Claims Act.
Excluded also are those persons who act under color of state law rather
than as direct state officials. Moreover, tort claims acts are not formulated
to encompass the uniquely federal concerns of the Reconstruction Civil
Rights Acts. As a New Mexico federal district court held under analogous
facts, "[a] section 1983 claim is not analogous to a cause of action brought
under a state tort claims act, because tort claims acts are based on 'state
concepts of sovereign immunity ...alien to the purposes to be served
by the Civil Rights Act."' 63 The DeVargas court's protestations notwithstanding, the determination of the most analogous state statute is appropriately resolved by federal, not state, courts. The Reconstruction Civil
Rights Acts are federal statutes embodying federal concerns. There is
simply no reason to consider widely varied and parochial state concerns.
59. 97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d 166 (1982).
60. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-15 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
61. 97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d 166 (1982), affig 97 N.M. 450, 640 P.2d 1327 (Ct. App. 1981).
The courts analogized § 1983 to N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-12 (Repl. Pamp. 1982), which provides in
full:
The immunity granted pursuant to Subsection A of Section 41-4-4 NMSA 1978
does not apply to liability for personal injury, bodily injury, wrongful death or
property damage resulting from assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, defamation of character,
violation of property rights or deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the constitution and laws of the United States or New Mexico when
caused by law enforcement officers while acting within the scope of their duties.
62. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§41-4-1 to -29 (Repl. Pamp. 1982). The officers must be acting within
the scope of their duties.
63. Gunther v. Miller, 498 F. Supp. 882, 883 (D.N.M. 1980) (citing Donovan v. Reinbold, 433
F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1970)).
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3. Criticisms of the Traditional Analyses
The pitfalls of traditional Type I and Type II reasoning are evident.'
The Type I approach merely sidesteps careful analysis by mischaracterizing the claim as akin to a state claim. A section 1981 employment
discrimination claim is inherently discrete from a common law contracts
claim. The genesis of the two claims, their elements of proof, and the
wrongs they were intended to redress are fundamentally different.
The problem with the Type II approach is that it is factually dependent.
An alteration in any of the facts supporting the claim could change the
court's characterization of the claim. The ensuing categorization of the
claim within the state's statutory scheme could consequently differ. Type
II reasoning, therefore, subverts the goals of uniformity and certainty.65
The major disadvantage of both Type I and Type II analysis is that
they are both heavily reliant on state law in categorizing the claim presented so that 67references to federal law are "of little import."' In the
"normal case" courts "have quickly abandoned the pretense that [the]
reason for selecting one among many state limitations provisions is that
it best serves federal interests." 68
Type I and Type II analyses deviate from both the policies underlying
the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts and such elemental concerns of
64. Exemplary of the analogy to common-law tort or contract and its pitfalls is the 'third Circuit's
en banc consideration of the issue in Polite v. Diehl, 507 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc). In
Polite, an automobile driven by the plaintiff struck a vehicle stopped at a stop sign. Id. at 121. The
defendant, a city police officer, transported Mr. Polite and his passengers to a local hospital. Id. On
the defendant's instruction, Mr. Polite's car was towed away from the accident scene. Id. The
defendant placed Mr. Polite under arrest on charges of driving under the influence of alcohol and
disorderly conduct. Id. Mr. Polite alleged that while he was detained at the police station he was
beaten and then forced to plead guilty to the charges against him. Id. Twenty-three months after his
arrest, Mr. Polite filed a civil rights complaint alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and
1985. Mr. Polite alleged four claims: 1) that he was detained and incarcerated without probable
cause or the opportunity to consult with his lawyer; 2) that he was subjected to verbal and physical
abuse; 3) that he was forced to plead guilty to the charges alleged; and 4) that his vehicle was
unlawfully seized. Id.
In selecting the applicable statute of limitations, the Third Circuit utilized Type II reasoning in
determining the limitations periods which would have been applied had an analogous action been
brought in state court. Id. at 122. The results were chaotic. The court held that a one-year Pennsylvania
statute covering false arrest governed the first claim. Id. at 122-23. The claim of verbal and physical
abuse was subject to a two-year limitation on assault and battery claims. Id. The court held that the
third claim of a coerced plea was govened by a two-year ex delicto statute applicable to claims of
wrongful injury not resulting in death. Id. The final claim of the wrongful seizure of the automobile
was determined to be governed by a six-year statute for actions for the recovery of goods. Id.
The decision in Polite abrogates virtually all of the tenets set forth above as desirable ends for
statutes of limitations in civil rights cases. The approach adopted may have resolved the dispute at
bar but contributed little to the Third Circuit's jurisprudence.
65. See supra notes 23-37 and accompanying text.
66. Ingram v. Steven Robert Corp., 547 F2d 1260, 1261 (5th Cir. 1977).
67. Id.
68. Id.
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jurisprudence as certainty and uniformity. The Supreme Court has frequently interpreted the deprivation of a constitutional right as "signifi"6
cantly different from and more serious than a violation of a state right. ....
the
deprivation
would
in
the
cases
where
distinction
is
more
obvious
The
not constitute a violation of the common law but would abridge constitutional rights, as for example, in the loss of voting rights or the abnegation of the right to attend unsegregated schools.7' The difference between
the deprivation of constitutional and state rights exists, however, even if
the same act constitutes both a state tort and a deprivation of a constitutional right. 7'
The distinction is best understood as the difference between the violation of rights protected by the Constitution and violations of duties of
care which arise out of common-law tort law.72 As Mr. Justice Douglas
observed when discussing the criminal counterpart of section 1983"3 in
Screws v. United States74:
Violation of local law does not necessarily mean that federal rights
have been invaded. The fact that a prisoner is assaulted, injured, or
even murdered by state officials does not necessarily mean that he
is deprived of any right protected or secured by the Constitution or
the laws of the United States. 7
By analogizing the section 1981 or section 1983 cause of action to a
"state claim" (Type 1)76 or by envisioning federal courts as state courts
applying state law (Type II),7 7 the uniquely federal nature of the civil

rights claim is ignored. A federal right is not "in any way entangled in
a skein of state law that must be untangled before the federal case can
respondents' conduct is legal or
proceed. . . It is immaterial whether
78
illegal as a matter of state law."

The precedential value of a decision based on one of the traditional
approaches is negligible, as causes of action are factually dependent and
consequently distinguishable. The result serves to deprive both plaintiffs
and defendants of any ability to predict accurately which analogy the
court will select. The unfortunate result of the approaches is to encourage
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 196 n.5.
Id. at 196. See also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 (1978).
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979).
18 U.S.C. §52 (1940), recodifiedat 18 U.S.C. §242 (1968).
325 U.S. 91 (1945).
Id. at 108-09.
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 674 (1963).
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a plethora of both original suits and appeals that would otherwise be
known to be time-barred." 9 The approaches also put an artificial premium
on counsel's ability to persuade the court that the claims alleged do or
do not sound in particular torts. s° Statutes of limitation sound in equity,
not in the rigid confines of artful pleading."
Most importantly, the approaches fail to recognize that federal civil
rights causes of action are analytically discrete from factually similar
common-law claims.8 2 Consequently, the approaches neglect the uniquely
federal interests underlying the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts. 3 Despite its pitfalls, analogy to common-law tort or contract is favored by
the Third84 and District of Columbia85 Circuits, and is occasionally utilized
by the Fifth, 86 Sixth,87 and Eleventh88 Circuits.
4. A Federal Cause of Action: The Type III Result
The federal courts which have rejected an analogy to the underlying
tort or contract have selected from three alternatives: 1) statutes governing
liabilities created by statute; 2) ex delicto or general tort statutes; and 3)
residuary limitations statutes. The reasoning by which each is selected
implicitly rejects Type I and Type II reasoning. Rather, the Type III
reasoning which is employed by these courts focuses on determining
which state statute is most analogous to the federal cause of action for
violations of the Constitution.89
Type III reasoning cuts closest to the intent of the Reconstruction Civil
Rights Acts. By defining each cause of action as federal in origin, the
approach allows courts to determine which of a state's limitations statutes
is most nearly analogous to all transgressions of constitutional rights.
Because every such abridgement is similarly analogized, certainty and
uniformity of result are promoted under Type III reasoning.
a. Statutes governing liabilities created by statute
Some courts have interpreted the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts as
creating or imposing statutory liabilities for'the infringement of consti79. See Note, Statutes of Limitations in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 1976 Ariz. St. L.J. 97,
119.
80. Id.
81. Cf. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
82. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
83. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 593 (1977); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,
239 (1972).
84. See infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 131-44 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 145-53 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 131-44 and accompanying text and text accompanying notes 171-72.
89. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
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tutional rights ." They reason that the most appropriate analogy is to state
limitations based upon statutory liabilities.
The approach has several advantages. It promotes consistency and
certainty of application. 9 Consequently, parties will know prior to litigation whether their suits will be time-barred. 9 2 Scarce judicial resources
are thus preserved.9 3 Use of the statutory liability analogy preserves the
conceptual distinction between federal constitutional causes of action and
common-law tort or contract claims. 94
The approach, however, is not analytically precise. The Supreme Court
9 5 that section
held in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization
1983 does not create substantive rights.' Rather, it is a remedial statute. 97
As the Court stated, "[Olne cannot go into court and claim a 'violation
of § 1983'-for § 1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything." 9 8 Section 1983 provides a statutory remedy, but the underlying
liability it enforces stems primarily from the Constitution." Reliance on
the statutory liability analogy, therefore, is flawed in that it focuses on
the statutory remedy and away from the elements of the cause of action."
b. Ex delicto statutes
Ex delicto statutes are those statutes which govem injuries to the rights
of another. Tort-based statutes derived from the common law can typically
provide for a "laundry list" of common-law tort injuries.' Delictual
statutes, therefore, focus on the cause of action, that is, the transgression
of rights, rather than the manner by which they were abridged.' 0 2
90. The approach is favored by the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. See infra notes 111-17,
157-63, 164-70 and accompanying text. The Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have also utilized
notes 130, 144, 171the approach, though the approach is not dominant in those circuits. See infra
72 and accompanying text. The Tenth Circuit also used a statutory liability analogy in Spiegel v.
School Dist. No. 1, 600 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1979), and referred to such an analogy in Denny v.
Hutchinson Sales Corp., 649 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1981). See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
91. Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1962).
92. See Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1981).
93. Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 643 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
94. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
95. 441 U.S. 600 (1979).
96. Id. at 617.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 651 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
100. The statutory liability analogy can be resuscitated if the statute encompasses actions to
recover upon a liability created or imposed by statute. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 214(2)
(McKinney 1978). As Judge Sofaer noted in his concurring opinion in Pauk v. Board of Trustees,
654 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1981), "[A]lthough the Constitution creates the substantive right asserted in
it is section 1983 that imposes civil liability and provides a cause of
a section 1983 action ....
action in federal court." Id. at 867 (Sofaer, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
101. Garcia v. University of Kansas, 702 F.2d 849, 853 (10th Cir. 1983) (Seymour, J., dissenting).
102. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
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The ex delicto approach fulfills the major goals of the Reconstruction
Civil Rights Acts statutory analogy selection. Like all of the approaches
which focus on a federal cause of action, use of ex delicto statutes implicitly rejects resort to analysis of the essential nature of the federal
claim. The transgression of personal rights generates the cause of action;
the analysis need go no further.
The ex delicto approach also furthers the goals of certainty and repose.
No confusion results from its application, for no examination of particular
common-law torts is performed. Consequently, the precedential value of
cases which employ it is commensurately enhanced. The result is to ensure
a predictable, uniform application of statutory time-bars.
The unsung virtue of the approach is its furthering of the broad remedial
purposes of the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts. 03
' Cast as interference
with the enjoyment of personal rights, ex delicto statutes encompass not
merely common-law torts, but deprivations of constitutionally secured
rights as well. In so doing, the approach cuts closest to the remedial
intent of the Acts.' 04
c. Residuary statutes
Residuary, or "catch-all" statutes are "next best" selections. While
promoting uniformity and certainty, the use of residuary statutes is analytically deficient as it effectively ignores the purposes of sections 1981
and 1983. Relegation of deprivations of constitutional rights to a state's
statutory scrapheap is perhaps to be expected, for as the Court has noted,
"[s]tate legislatures do not devise their limitations periods with national
interests in mind."' 05 As such, employment of residuary statutes does not
abdicate the responsibility of drawing an analogy' 6 as much as it is a
recognition that the states have not even colorably addressed the purposes
underlying the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts.

III. SURVEY OF THE CIRCUITS
The Type III approach endorsed above suggests an analytical structure
that has been fully accepted only by the Tenth Circuit. While some circuits
have recognized the failures of drawing an analogy to the common law
and occasionally have accepted a delictual analogy, no other circuit has
103.
104.
105.
106.
Courts'
§ 1983:
(1983).

United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1976).
A contrary view is argued in Note, Federal Civil Rights Act-The New Mexico Appellate
Choice of the Proper Limitations Periodfor Civil Rights Actions Filed Under 42 U.S.C.
De Vargas v. State ex. rel. New Mexico Department of Corrections, 13 N.M.L. Rev. 555
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done so with uniformity. The following survey of the circuits indicates
that few circuits have developed internally consistent approaches.
A. First Circuit
The First Circuit has rejected the underlying tort or contract approach 7
and generally has employed an ex delicto approach in characterizing civil
rights claims."0 8 Courts applying Massachusetts law, however, have used
a unique statute governing the filing of discrimination complaints before
a state administrative agency. " Because the Massachusetts cases have
solely concerned employment disputes, it is difficult to predict the statute
likely to be chosen in other contexts. The Circuit's concern in the reported
cases, however, has been the breach of the duty not to discriminate, not
the underlying employment contract. Selection of a delictually based
statute, therefore, appears likely." 0
B. Second Circuit
Analogy to the underlying tort or contract has been rejected by the
Second Circuit."' The vast majority of Second Circuit cases have arisen
107. Walden III, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 576 F.2d 945, 947 (1st Cir. 1978).
108. Puerto Rico: Fernandez v. Chardon, 681 F.2d 42 (1st Cit. 1982), aff'd sub nom Chardon
v. Fumero Soto, 103 S. Ct. 2611 (1983) (wrongful discharge of public employee); Rivera Fernandez
v. Chardon, 648 F.2d 765 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 454 U.S. 6 (1981), on remand
681 F.2d 42 (wrongful discharge of public employee); Gual Morales v. Hernandez Vega, 604 F.2d
730 (1st Cir. 1979) (wrongful discharge from public employment); Ramirez de Arellano v. Alvarez
de Choudens, 575 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1978) (§ 1983 suit for wrongful demotion of public employee);
Graffals Gonzales v. Garcia Santiago, 550 F.2d 687 (1st Cit. 1977) (politically motivated discharge
from public employment).
Rhode Island: Walden III, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 576 F.2d 945 (1st Cit. 1978) (malicious prosectution resulting in school closing).
Maine: Gashgai v. Leibowitz, 703 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1983) (state medical licensing board sanctioned
doctor without due process).
109. Carter v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 684 F.2d 187 (Ist Cir. 1982) (§ 1981 refusal to rehire);
Holden v. Commission Against Discrimination, 671 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1982) (§ 1983 suit for allegedly
racially motivated discharge); Hussey v. Sullivan, 651 F.2d 74 (1st Cir. 1981) (failure to promote
due to exercise of First Amendment rights); Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 893 (1980) (racially motivated failure to promote).
The pitfalls of employing that statute are evident in Holden, 671 F.2d 30. In Holden, the court
parsed the claims into ones of free speech, equal protection, and due process. The court held the
first two were governed by the statute applicable to discrimination complaints, the third by a statute
covering actions for the reinstatement of civil servants. Such reasoning muddies the analytical waters
and places an artificial premium on counsel's ability to frame the legal issues artfully. The potential
turmoil was mooted by the Massachusetts Legislature, which had fortuitously placed identical time
limits on the statutes.
The continuing vitality of the analogy has been shaken by the Court's holding in Burnett v. Grattan,
104 S. Ct. 2924 (1984), that a similar Maryland statute failed to provide sufficient time to prepare
for litigation.
110. In Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99 (1st Cir. 1980), the court focused on the nature of the
federal cause of action in developing an analytical process, much as is done in the Type III approach
detailed above, supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
111. Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 866 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000
(1982).
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in New York and characterize Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts claims
as liabilities created by statute. "2 The Second Circuit acknowledges
difficulties"' with the Supreme Court's holding in Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Organization"' that section 1983 does not create any
substantive rights. Concerns of stare decisis"5 and the lack of a better
alternative in New York," 6 however, have militated in favor of retaining
the approach. Circuit-wide uniformity has been precluded by the lack of
a similar statute of limitations for liabilities created by statute in Connecticut. There, an ex delicto approach has been employed." 7

C. Third Circuit
The Third Circuit has been characterized as defining the federal cause
of action in terms of factually similar state actions." 8 In practical terms,
this means that the Third Circuit has often analyzed section 1981 or 1983
claims in terms of an analogous underlying tort or contract. 119 The Circuit's sole en banc consideration of the topic, Polite v. Diehl, 2 dictates
such an approach. When analyzed by state, however, only those cases
112. Those cases employing the analogy to liabilities created by statute include: Pauk v. Board
of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982) (retaliatory denial of
tenure to professor); Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1980) (assault, false
arrest, and malicious prosecution); Taylor v. Mayone, 626 F.2d 247 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 920 (1980) (excessive force in arrest); Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613
F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980) (§ 1983 suit for wrongful discharge from public employment); Leigh v.
McGuire, 613 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded (for consideration in light of Board
of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980)), 446 U.S. 962 (1980) (wrongful discharge from public
employment); Keyse v. California Texas Oil Corp., 590 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1978) (§ 1981 claim for
failure to promote); Regan v. Sullivan, 557 F.2d 300 (2d Ci. 1977) (§ 1985 action for arrest without
probable cause; application of residuary statute of limitations possible as well); Meyer v. Frank, 550
F.2d 726 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977) (wrongful administrative discharge without
assistance of counsel); De Matteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1975) (§ 1981 suit
for retaliatory firing because of sale of house to a black); Kaiser v. Calm, 510 F.2d 282 (2d Cir.
1974) (malicious pretrial publicity by district attorney caused unfair trial); Rosenberg v. Martin, 478
F.2d 520 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872 (1973) (assault and malicious pretrial publicity);
Ortiz v. LaVallee, 442 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1971) (assault on a prisoner); Romer v. Leary, 425 F.2d
186 (2d Cir. 1970) (§ 1983 claim for wrongful termination); Swan v. Board of Higher Educ., 319
F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1963) (suspension of student for exercising first amendment rights); Bomar v.
Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947) (nontenured teacher fired for

serving on jury).
113. Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d at 861-66.
114. 441 U.S. 600 (1979).

115. Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d at 862.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 862-66.
Williams v. Walsh, 558 F.2d 667 (2d Ci. 1977) (wrongful discharge of police officer).
Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 644 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
507 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc).
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arising in Pennsylvania have employed that approach. 2 ' Two recent Pennsylvania cases alleging economic injury resulting from public employees'22
dismissals have been held to be governed by the state's residuary statute. 123
Cases arising in New Jersey have looked to that state's ex delicto statute.

D. Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit has clearly recognized the delictual nature of injuries
arising under the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts. The court in Almond
v. Kent,'24 for example, applied Virginia's ex delicto statute to the plaintiff's claim against a sheriff and state police "not because there was a
right of recovery at common law but because there was a violation of a
constitutional right not to be beaten. "',25 The Almond court's reasoning

implies that section 1983 transcends physical injuries. The Circuit also
has extended the application of an ex delicto statute to a wrongful ter-26
mination case. In McCausland v. Mason County Board of Education,
where a high school principal alleged that he was discharged without
proper cause, West Virginia's ex delicto statute was applied, because "to
121. Sandutch v. Muroski, 684 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1982) (conspiracy to prosecute wrongfullyunderlying torts of false arrest and false imprisonment); Liotta v. National Forge Co., 629 F.2d 903
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981) (racially based discharge--underlying contract); Skehan
v. Board of Trustees, 590 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979) (firing of
nontenured professor-underlying contract); Davis v. U.S. Steel Supply, 581 F.2d 335 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1256 (1983) (§ 1981 action based on racially discriminatory employment practices-underlying contract); Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n,
559 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1977) (§ 1981 claim of racial discrimination in the transfer of housing coop
units--underlying contract); Polite v. Diehl, 507 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc) (underlying torts
of unlawful arrest, assault and battery, conversion, and malicious prosecution); Ammlung v. City of
Chester, 494 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1974) (wrongful arrest and cruel and unusual treatment during
prearraignment confinement-underlying torts); Orlando v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 455 F.2d 972
(3d Cir. 1972) (plaintiff fired by employer defendant for encouraging personal injury claims against
it--underlying torts of slander, libel, and malicious prosecution); Hilemann v. Knable, 391 F.2d 596
(3d Cir. 1968) (underlying tort of false arrest); Henig v. Odorioso, 385 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1016 (1968) (underlying torts of false arrest, malicious prosecution, and false
imprisonment); Jones v. Bombeck, 375 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1967) (defendants conspired to induce
plaintiff to commit a burglary--underlying tort of malicious prosecution): Gaito v. Strauss, 249 F.
Supp. 923 (W.D. Pa.), affid, 368 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 977 (1967).
122. Fitzgerald v. Larson, 741 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1984); Knoll v. Springfield Township School
Dist., 699 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 3571 (1984).
123. Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972) (unlawful force during arrest); Thomas v.
Howard, 455 F.2d 228 (3d Cir. 1972) (constitutionally inadequate counsel); Hughes v. Smith, 389
F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1968) (prisoner beaten to coerce a confession). But see Aitchison v. Roffiani, 708
F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1983) (wrongful termination claim governed by statute governing suits against
public officials).
124. 459 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1972).
125. Id. at 203-04.
126. 649 F.2d 278 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981).
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demonstrate the required constitutional basis for his federal complaint he
must allege personal injury transcending contract rights."1 27 The ex delicto
approach has been used in cases arising in Virginia and West Virginia.' 2
The Supreme Court has recently affirmed the Fourth Circuit's application of a residuary statute to a claim arising in Maryland.' 2 9
Claims arising in North Carolina are aberrations; the court has without
sufficient explanation applied the state statute governing liabilities created
by statute. 30
E. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit has created an analytical morass in the dozens of its
cases which have addressed the issue. It has used on various occasions
each of three analytical models described above."'3 It has analogized to
each of the four sorts of state statutes, often failing to develop a coherent
approach within a given state.' 32 The circuit has also distinguished between tort and contractually related offenses.' 33
While generalizations are quite difficult to draw, some conclusions
regarding the Fifth Circuit's posture can be reached. Cases arising in
Louisiana ' and Alabama'35 have clearly adopted an ex delicto approach.
127. Id. at 279.
128. Virginia: Cramer v. Crutchfield, 648 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1981) (illegal search and malicious
prosecution); Johnson v. Davis, 582 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1978) (prisoner subjected to threats and
humiliation); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
920 (1976) (§ 1981 action alleging discrimination in the hiring of skilled labor); McCrary v. Runyon,
515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975), affd, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (private school racial discrimination);
Revere v. Tidewater Tel. Co., 485 F.2d 684 (4th Cir. 1973) (§ 1981 employment discrimination);
Allen v. Gifford, 462 F.2d 615 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 876 (1972) (§ 1982 action based
on racial discrimination in sale of real estate); Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1972).
West Virginia:McCausland v. Mason County Bd. of Educ., 649 F.2d 278 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1098 (1981).
In the South Carolina case of Hickman v. Fincher, 483 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1973) (racial discrimination in the sale of a house), the court declined to choose a statute of limitations, noting that even
under the shortest statute the plaintiff's suit was timely filed.
129. Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S. Ct. 2924 (1984), affig 710 F.2d 160 (4th Ci. 1983).
130. Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1980) (conspiracy to maliciously prosecute plaintiff
and to destroy his property); Bireline v. Seagondollar, 567 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 842 (1979) (wrongful termination from teaching position); Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47
(4th Cir. 1975) (involuntary permanent sterilization of welfare recipient).
131. Compare Ingram v. Steven Robert Corp., 547 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1977) (utilizing Types I
and II discussed supra at notes 38-39 and accompanying text) with Braden v. Texas A & M Univ.
Sys., 636 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1981) (utilizing Type III discussed supra at notes 40-46 and accompanying
text).
132. An example is Texas where the ex delicto statute is frequently used, see, e.g., Smith v.
Avance, 533 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Tex.), aff'd, 683 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1982), but where the underlying
tort statute, see, e.g., Bryant v. Potts, 528 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1976), and contract statute, see, e.g.,
Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974), have also been utilized.
133. See Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 645-46 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
134. The Louisiana statute applied, La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3536 (1953), pertaining to "offenses
and quasi offenses" clearly sounds in tort. See Jones v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 679 F.2d 32
(5th Cir. 1982), affid in part, rev'd in part on reh'g, 688 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1982) (wrongful
termination of teacher). Other cases include: Pegues v. Morehouse Parish School Bd., 632 F.2d
1279 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981) (wrongful termination of teacher, dicta
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The court has occasionally followed that path for claims arising in Texas 3 '
and Georgia.' 37 In four states, Mississippi, 3 ' Florida,'39 Texas," * and
suggesting that, if plaintiff had been tenured, statute applicable to salaries could be utilized was
limited in Jones, 679 F.2d 32); Lavellee v. Listi, 611 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1980) (assault on prisoner
and failure to provide medical attention); Humble v. Foreman, 563 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1977) (conspiracy during plea bargaining); Shelley v. Bayou Metals, 561 F.2d 1209 (5th Cir. 1977) (§ 1981
action based on employment discrimination); Page v. U.S. Indus., 556 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045 (1978) (wrongful discharge); Kissinger v. Foti, 544 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir.
1977) (beating of prisoner); Heyn v. Board of Supervisors, 417 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1976), affd,
550 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1977) (teacher alleging free speech deprivation).
Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971), disapproved
on other grounds, Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (0 1981 discriminatory
employment), which looked to the underlying employment contract to determine the appropriate
statute of limitations for a § 1981 action based on discriminatory employment appears to be without
continued vitality.
135. Ray v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 677 F.2d 818 (11 th Cir. 1981) (wrongful termination); Rubin
v. O'Koren, 644 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1981) (wrongful termination of teacher); Prince v. Wallace,
568 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1978) (deprivation of speedy trial rights and cruel and unusual punishment);
Ingram v. Steven Robert Corp., 547 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1977) (§ 1981 wrongful discharge); Boshell
v. Alabama Mental Health Bd., 473 F.2d 1369 (5th Cir. 1973) (§ 1983 action alleging wrongful
discharge resulting from exercise of first amendment privileges); Beard v. Stephens, 372 F.2d 685
(5th Cir. 1967) (newly deputized store owners gun down burglars; unlawful conspiracy); Buckner
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 339 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. Ala. 1972), affid, 476 F.2d 1287 (5th
Cir. 1973) (§ 1981 action based on discriminatory job placement).
Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
Il15 (1979) (§ 1981 claim of discriminatory employment), followed Boudreaux, 437 F.2d 1011,
see supra note 134, and is similarly inapposite.
Hess v. Eddy, 689 F.2d 977 (11 th Cir. 1982) (plaintiffs decedent murdered in county jail), applied
without analysis Alabama's wrongful death statute.
136. Smith v. Avance, 553 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Tex.), affid, 683 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1982) (false
arrest and battery); Braden v. Texas A & M Univ. Sys., 636 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1981) (wrongful
termination; rejecting underlying employment contract approach); Miller v. Smith, 615 F.2d 1037
(5th Cir. 1980), reh'g granted, 625 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1980) (wrongful arrest); Jackson v. Duke, 259
F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1958) (assault, false imprisonment, and unlawful force during arrest).
137. Georgia cases have used ex delito analysis when the asserted injury is to the body of the
plaintiff, though not in employment-based disputes. See Neel v. Rehberg, 577 F.2d 262 (5th Cir.
1978) (cruel and unusual incarceration and denial of access to attorney); Wooten v. Sanders, 572
F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1978) (assault during arrest); Shank v. Spruill, 406 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1969)
(forceful extradition without due process).
138. In White v. United Parcel Serv., 692 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1982), the court looked to a new
statute covering unwritten contracts of employment in a § 1981 wrongful discharge action. See also
Shaw v. McCorkle, 537 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir. 1976) (court, in suit for wrongful arrest and assault
brought against police officers and their surety, looked to the underlying contract of the surety bond).
139. McWilliams v. Escambia County School Bd., 658 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1981) (employment
discrimination); Caldwell v. Martin Marietta Corp., 632 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1980) (discriminatory
layoff); Williams v. Rhoden, 629 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1980) (false imprisonment and battery); Williams
v. Western Electric Co., 618 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir. 1980) (§ 1981 action alleging wrongful discharge);
Cutliff v. Greyhound Lines, 558 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1977) (§ 1981 employment discrimination). Cf.
Knowles v. Carson, 419 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1969) (conspiracy to frame plaintiff).
140. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 619 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1980)
(en banc) (§ 1981 action based on employment discrimination), aff'd, 452 U.S. 89 (1981); Prophet
v. Armco Steel, Inc., 575 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1978) (§ 1981 action alleging wrongful termination);
Bryant v. Potts, 528 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1976) (wrongful seizure and detention of prisoner's property);
Kittrell v. City of Rockwall, 526 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 925 (1976)
(desecration of cemetary by city); Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir.
1974) (§ 1981 action averring discriminatory work assignment); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974) (employment discrimination); McGuire v. Baker, 421 F.2d 895
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970) (conspiracy to deprive landowners of property).
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Georgia 4 . the court has looked to the underlying tort or contract, though
that choice is by no means uniform in those states. Mississippi law is
particularly confusing as it has accepted the validity of a tort-based approach, without specifying whether it would take the ex delicto or underlying tort track. 142 Occasionally, though, the residuary statute has been
pressed into service.' 43 Infrequently, the court has looked to statutes governing liabilities created by statute as well."'

F. Sixth Circuit
While the Sixth Circuit's approach has been characterized as varying
according to available state statutes of limitation,' 45 a better characterization would be that there is little uniformity whether measured by state,"4
by cause of action,' 47 or by method of analysis.' 48 The majority of cases
are tort based, though those cases are split fairly evenly between the ex
delicto and common-law tort approaches. Claims arising in Michigan4 9
141. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 419 U.S.
1050 (1974) (§ 1981 action based on employment discrimination).
142. See Tnrvillion v. King's Daughters Hosp., 614 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1980).
142. Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 673 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1982) (§ 1981 action alleging
employment discrimination); Truvillion v. King's Daughters Hosp., 614 F.2d 520 (5th Cit. 1980);
Franklin v. City of Marks, 439 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1971) (statutory deannexation deprived plaintiffs
of essential revenues and right to vote).
144. Georgia:Scarlett v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 676 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1982) (§ 1981 action
based on deprivation of benefits and work opportunities; equitable relief only; back wages governed
by backpay statute); Whatley v. Department of Educ., 673 F.2d 873 (5th Cit. 1982) (wrongful
discharge; similar bifurcation between legal and equitable relief).
Florida:White v. Padgett, 475 F.2d 79 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 861 (1973) (wrongful
detention in asylum); Nevels v. Wilson, 423 F.2d 691 (5th Cit. 1970).
145. Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 646 (10th Cit. 1984) (en banc).
146. Claims arising in Ohio, for example, have employed ex delicto, underlying tort, and liabilities
created by statute analogies. See, e.g., Crawford v. Zeitler, 326 F.2d 119 (6th Cit. 1964) (ex delicto);
Kilgore v. City of Mansfield, 679 F.2d 632 (6th Cit. 1982) (underlying tort); Mason v. OwensIllinois, Inc., 517 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1975) (liability created by statute).
147. Compare Mohler v. Miller, 235 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1956) *(underlyingtort approach to claims
of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution), with Williams v. Hollins, 428 F.2d 1221 (6th
Cir. 1970) (ex delicto approach to claims of malicious prosecution).
148. Compare Madison v. Wood, 410 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1969), with Carmicle v. Weddle, 555
F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1977).
149. Ex delicto: Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057 (6th Cit. 1973) (§ 1981 action based
on failure to promote due to race and religious preference); Madison v. Wood, 410 F.2d 564 (6th
Cir. 1969) (wrongful demotion of policeman); Knim v. Sheppard, 255 F. Supp. 994 (W.D. Mich.
1966), aft'd, 407 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1969) (wrongful arrest, unlawful search, and malicious prosecution).
Underlying Tort: Mulligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1968) (false arrest and wrongful
seizure of property); Mohler v. Miller, 235 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1956) (false imprisonment and malicious
prosecution).
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and Ohio 5 ' have used both approaches. Cases arising in Tennessee have
employed an ex delicto analogy. 5 ' Kentucky claims have been analogized
' To further muddy the waters, the court has used
to an underlying tort. 52
an analogy to liabilities created by statute as well. 53
G. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit has been unable to select a uniform statute of
limitations due to differences in the states' statutory schema. However,
it has rejected on policy grounds the underlying tort approach, holding
that the fragmentation of the single cause of action created by Congress
in accordance with analogies to rights created by state law would result
in "inconsistency and confusion. "' Claims arising in Illinois have employed that state's residuary limitations period. 1' Those arising in Indiana
have following an ex delicto approach.' 56
150. Ex delicto: Crawford v. Zeitler, 326 E2d 119 (6th Cit. 1964) (wrongful arrest and extradition). In Warner v. Perrino, 585 F.2d 171 (6th Cir. 1978), the court applied Ohio's 180-day statute
governing complaints filed under the state's fair housing law to the plaintiff's § 1982 claims. While
such statutes are difficult to categorize, it is most precise to include them as ex delicto, as they
generally speak in terms of a duty not to discriminate.
Underlying Tort: Kilgore v. City of Mansfield, 679 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1982) (false arrest and false
imprisonment; rejecting a statute for actions upon a liability created by statute); Austin v. Brammer,
555 F.2d 142 (6th Cir. 1977) (malicious prosecution).
151. Harrison v. Wright, 457 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1972) (battery of prisoner); Williams v. Hollins,
428 F.2d 1221 (6th Cir. 1970) (malicious prosecution).
152. Carmicle v. Weddle, 555 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1977) (false arrest).
153. Kentucky: Garner v. Stephens, 460 F.2d 1144 (6th Cir. 1972) (mandatory maternity leave
following childbirth for teachers).
Ohio: Mason v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 517 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1975) (§ 1981 action based on
wrongful discharge and failure to promote).
154. Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 337 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978)
(quoting Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1962)).
155. Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978)
(wrongful custodial killing of plaintiff; rejecting the underlying tort theory of Jones v. Jones, 410
F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1970)); Teague v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
566 F.2d 7 (7th Cir. 1977) (§ 1981 action based on racial harassment); Inada v. Sullivan, 523 F.2d
485 (7th Cir. 1975) (wrongful arrest); Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 894 (1972) (coerced confession); Rinehart v. Locke, 454 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1971) (wrongful
arrest); Weber v. Consumers Digest, Inc., 440 F.2d 729 (7th Cir. 1971) (conspiracy between defendant
and judges to restrain trade); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970) (§ 1981
action alleging discriminatory hiring); Baker v. F & F Investment, 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970) (§ 1982 class action brought by purchasers of new homes alleging
unfavorable terms in installment contracts); Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1958).
156. Movement for Opportunity and Equality v. General Motors Corp., 622 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir.
1980) (racial and sexual discrimination claim; court applied statute governing injuries to character);
Sacks Bros. Loan Co. v. Cunningham, 578 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1978) (statute governing actions
against a public officer applied to § 1983 action against tax assessor); Hill v. Trustees of Indiana
Univ., 537 F.2d 248 (7th Cir. 1976) (student claim that state university did not follow correct internal
procedure in failing him from course).
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H. Eighth Circuit
Early Eighth Circuit cases had split between those which analogized
civil rights cases to similar common-law torts and those which recognized
a fundamental difference between civil rights claims and common-law
torts.' 57 In Garmon v. Foust, 58the en banc court rejected the tort analogy
as "unduly cramp[ing] the significance of section 1983 as a broad, statutory remedy."' 59 Garmon looked to the Iowa statutes and selected the
state's residuary limitations period."W
Garmon apparently overturned a line of cases in Iowa, Missouri, and
Minnesota which utilized the underlying tort analogy.' 6 ' Some diversity
will continue in the circuit, as the result of differences in the states'
statutory schema. The Garmon court, in dicta, expressed its approval of
an analogy to statutes governing liabilities created by statute. 162 Cases
employing that analogy remain viable. 163 While there remains some un157. Compare Lamb v. Amalgamated Labor Life Ins. Co., 602 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1979) (underlying insurance contract), with Chambers v. Omaha Public School Dist., 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir.
1976) (§ 1981 and § 1983 discriminatory denial of tenure claims governed by liabilities created by
statute provision).
158. 668 F.2d 400 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998 (1982).
159. Id. at 406.
160. Accord Tatum v. Golden, 570 F2d 753 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 960 (1978)
(discriminatory reassignment of black Methodist ministers).
161. Overturned were:
Missouri: Lamb v. Amalgamated Labor Life Ins. Co., 602 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1979) (underlying
insurance contract); Allen v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 788, 554 F.2d 876 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 891 (1977) (racial discrimination by union in failing to grant seniority and other
rights secured by collective bargaining agreement-statute covering breach of written contracts);
Drake v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 553 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir. 1977) (§ 1981 action based on wrongful
discharge-underlying employment contract); Greene v. Carter Carburetor Co., 532 F.2d 125 (8th
Cir. 1976) (§ 1981 discriminatory discharge; underlying employment contract); Green v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated in part on other grounds, 411 U.S. 792
(1973) (racially based discharge of black activist; underlying employment contract).
Minnesota: Savage v. United States, 450 F.2d 449 (8th Cit. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1043
(1972) (wrongful indictment; underlying torts of defamation and malicious prosecution).
Iowa: Johnson v. Dailey, 479 F.2d 86 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1009 (1973) (fabrication
of facts by prosecutor; statute covering injuries to the person).
162. 668 F.2d at 406 nn.7 & 11.
163. Arkansas: Wagh v. Dennis, 677 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1982) (§ 1981 and § 1983 actions based
on wrongful termination from public employment); Marshall v. Kirkland, 602 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir.
1979) (§ 1981 and § 1983 actions based on discriminatory hiring of teachers); Martin v. GeorgiaPacific Corp., 568 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1977) (§ 1981 action based on racial discrimination in employment); Clark v. Mann, 562 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1977) (racially motivated failure to renew
teaching contracts); Williams v. Anderson, 562 F2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1977) (racial discrimination in
employment of teachers); Reed v. Hutto, 486 F.2d 534 (8th Cir. 1973) (prisoner forced to engage
in homosexual acts); Glasscoe v. Howell, 431 F.2d 863 (8th Cir. 1970) (wrongful arrest and unnecessary force; analogy to residuary clause also considered possible).
Nebraska: Chambers v. Omaha Public School Dist., 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1976) (§ 1981 and
§ 1983 actions based on discriminatory denial of tenure).
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certainty as to which statute will be selected within each state, the major
hurdle of developing a consistent analytical approach has been cleared.
I. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit has a relatively unbroken line of cases applying state
statutes governing liabilities created by statute. The seminal case of Smith
v. Cremins'" rejected an analogy to underlying torts stating:
Inconsistency and confusion would result if the single cause of action
created by Congress were fragmented in accordance with analogies
drawn to rights created by state law and the several differing periods
of limitation applicable to each state-created right were applied to
the single federal cause of action.' 65
Suits arising in California, " Montana, 67 Nevada,"'6 and Arizona"s have
analogized civil rights claims to liabilities created by statute. The court
has referred to ex delicto statutes in claims arising in Washington and
Oregon. "0
164. 308 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1962).
165. Id. at 190.
166. Wiltshire v. Standard Oil Co., 652 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1981) (§ 1981 action alleging discriminatory discharge); Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1981) (§ 1981 and § 1983 actions
alleging failure to promote); Bratton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 649 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1980) (§ 1981
action based on discriminatory wage, promotion, and work assignments structure); May v. Enomoto,
633 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1980) (prisoner denied medical care following injury); Jackson v. Hayakawa,
605 F.2d 1121 (9th Ci. 1979) (unconstitutional mass arrest and blacklisting of student protestors);
Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 569 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1978) (gender discrimination in hiring);
Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1977) (alleged child molester consented to castration in
return for lesser charge); Bergschneider v. Denver, 446 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1971); Mills v. Small,
446 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1971) (county official made false report); Ney v. California, 439 F2d 1285
(9th Cir. 1971) (malicious prosecution); Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F2d 738 (9th Cir. 1970) (loss
of public employment for exercise of first amendment rights); Willis v. Reddin, 418 F2d 702 (9th
Cir. 1969) (confiscation of property depriving prisoner of ability to make bail); Lambert v. Conrad,
308 E2d 571 (9th Cir. 1962) (false arrest); Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1962)
(deprivation of first amendment rights).
The decision in Marshall v. Kleppe, 637 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1980) (§ 1981 action based on
wrongful cancellation of Small Business Administration loan), which rejects the line of cases employing statutes governing liabilities created by statute and employs California's residuary statute,
has not been followed.
167. Strung v. Anderson, 452 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1971) (illegal search).
168. Mason v. Schaub, 564 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1977) (wrongful arrest and illegal detention).
169. Major v. Arizona State Prison, 642 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1981) (retaliation against prisoner for
participation in work strike); Tyler v. Reynolds Metals Co., 600 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1979) (§ 1981
action based on wrongful termination).
170. Washington: Rose v. Rinaldi, 654 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1981); Shouse v. Pierce County, 559
F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1977) (election proportionality; either residuary or ex delicto statute applicable);
Horn v. Bailie, 309 F.2d 167 (9th Cir. 1962) (coerced confession) (dicta).
Oregon: Kosikowski v. Bourne, 659 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1981) (deprivation of first amendment
rights; statute expressly applicable to § 1983 claims applied). Kosikowski is contrary to the circuit's
policy, as Oregon does have a statute applicable to liabilities created by statute, Or. Rev. Stat. § 12,
080(2).
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J. Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as binding precedent the decisions
of the Fifth Circuit handed down by that court as of September 30, 1982. "7
The Eleventh Circuit's approach therefore is discussed at length above.' 72
K. District of Columbia Circuit
The District of Columbia Circuit adopted an analogy to the underlying
common-law tort in McClam v. Barry.73
' The court there recognized that
constitutional claims "differ from closely analogous common-law claims
in the interests they protect, in their elements and origins, and in their
importance."' 74 The court held, however, that these differences did not
destroy the analogy to common law. "If two claims, such as commonlaw false arrest and constitutional false arrest. . . are so alike that 'plaintiffs can be expected to plead [the] common-law [claim] as a pendent
claim in constitutional suits,' then the same judgment about repose applies
to both claims."'" The court's focus then is fact-oriented rather than
predicated on constitutional considerations.
McClam was recently overruled.' 76 The circuit held that the statute
selected was not analogous because the policies underlying the District
of Columbia's notice provision were not akin to the policies underlying
statutes of limitations.' While McClam's statutory analogy may have
been discarded,
the circuit's approach to the issue appears to remain
78
intact. 1
IV. THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S RESOLUTION:
GARCIA v. WILSON

Garcia v. Wilson was the product of several years of confusion in the
Tenth Circuit over the appropriate limitations periods for civil rights
claims. Earlier Tenth Circuit cases had found analogies to common-law
contracts,' 79 liabilities created by statute,' ex delicto statutes,'' and
171. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
172. See supra notes 131-44 and accompanying text.
173. 697 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
174. Id.at 373.
175. Id.at 375 (quoting Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
176. Brown v. United States, 742 F.2d 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
177. Id.at 1507-09.
178. Id.at 1501.
179. Shah v. Halliburton Co., 627 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1980); Brogan v. Wiggins School Dist.,
588 F.2d 409 (10th Cir. 1978); Zuniga v. AMFAC Foods, Inc., 580 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1978).
180. Spiegel v. School Dist. No. 1,600 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1979). See also Denny v. Hutchinson
Sales Corp., 649 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1981) (dicta).
181. Garcia v. University of Kansas, 702 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1983) (discriminatory hiring practices); Clulow v. Oklahoma, 700 F.2d 1291 (10th Cir. 1983) (involuntary confinement in psychiatric
hospital); Brown v. Bigger, 622 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir. 1980) (prisoner sued guards for forcibly putting
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residuary statutes. 82 The circuit's choice was generally one of statutory
expedience,'though the circuit had concluded as a matter of policy that
when a substantial question existed as to which state statute applied, the
83
trial court should apply the more generous limitations period.' The
circuit's reasoning was not always clearly enunciated, though it frequently
utilized Type II reasoning to analyze a claim according to its underlying
facts before drawing a state analogy. 84
185
It was not until Garciav. University of Kansas that the nature of the
cause of action for civil rights claims was critically debated. There, the
court announced that it would focus on the constitutional nature of the
86
civil rights claim rather than on factually dependent claims. The court
then adopted what this article has described as Type III reasoning.
Garcia v. Wilson expounded on the theme initiated in University of
Kansas. The en banc court juxtaposed its choice with the District of
87
Columbia Circuit's resolution in McClam v. Barry.' The Tenth Circuit
noted that McClam rests on two assumptions: first, that the facts required
to establish the federal claim are not sufficiently distinct from a comparable state claim to warrant a different statute of limitations; and second,
that state statutes of limitation are concerned primarily with fact-finding
certainty and settled expectations. Garcia declined to accept both postulates as certain. The former contention is rebutted by taking notice that
"the facts establishing a constitutional . . . deprivation frequently are

complex and peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant. "188 Those
facts, Garciacorrectly asserts, need not be proved in a comparable state
law action. The second postulate in McClam is rejected as overly narrow.
While fact-finding accuracy and settled expectations do motivate the enactment of state limitations periods, local concerns of little relevance to
national policies are also involved. Parochial interests such as limiting
the liability of local officials 8 9 or ensuring the durational and financial
limitations of surety bonds"9 have also been considered by state legishim into bed while he was a patient in a hospital); Hannon v. Woodson, Unpublished Opinion No.
76-1873 (10th Cir. April 18, 1977) (cruel and discriminatory treatment of black prisoners); Crosswhite
v. Brown, 424 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1970) (conspiracy to transport escaped prisoner without extradition
hearing).
182. Hansbury v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 596 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1979). In applying the
four-year statute of limitations found in N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-4 (1978), Hansbury did not distinguish whether it selected the clause covering "actions founded upon . . . unwritten contracts" or
the residuary clause also found therein. It seems probable that the latter was employed.
183. Zuniga v. AMFAC Foods, Inc., 580 F.2d 380 (10th Cit. 1978).
184. See, e.g., Shah v. Halliburton Co., 627 F.2d 1055 (10th Cit. 1980).
185. 702 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1983).
186. Id.
187. 697 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
188. Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 649 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
189. Peterson v. Fink, 515 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1975).
190. Shaw v. McCorkle, 537 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir. 1976).
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latures. Having rejected the underlying predicates of McClam, the Garcia
court declined to analogize further to comparable state law claims.
Garciathen proceeded to use Type III reasoning to select an ex delicto
statute as the one that best furthers the analogy to federal civil rights
claims. By segregating the cause of action from the remedy sought,
Garcia focused on the inherent nature of section 1983 as a vehicle for
preserving constitutional rights. Any deprivation of those rights, Garcia
declared, creates a cause of action that is essentially delictual." 9'
V. CONCLUSION
The hodgepodge of statutes to which Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts
claims have been analogized is the result of a failure of both critical
analysis and of judicial leadership. The analytical failure results in major
part from a neglect of the purposes underlying the Acts. The persistent
judicial mischaracterization of the Acts as somehow within the concerns
of the common law eviscerates their uniquely federal nature. By viewing
the Acts as vehicles to provide redress for the transgression of civil rights,
the delictual nature of the appropriate analogy becomes evident. Careful
analysis demonstrates that neither Type I nor Type II reasoning permits
that recognition. The Type III approach of determining which of a state's
statutes is most nearly analogous to an abridgment of the plaintiff's
constitutional rights fully effectuates that concern, as it acknowledges
that Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts claims are federal causes of action
and not merely akin to those arising under the common law.
The Tenth Circuit in Garciav. Wilson reached the best available solution
by employing Type III reasoning to recognize the constitutional character
of causes of action under the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts. The
Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Garcia makes possible the resolution of this dilemma that has so severely taxed bench, bar, and litigants.
On certiorari, the Court has the issue of the method for drawing the
appropriate limitations analogy to Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts claims
squarely before it. While its previous decisions would indicate the Tenth
Circuit's opinion to be well reasoned, the Court has in Garcia a vehicle
by which any continuing uncertainty can be finally laid to rest.
Because of the extant diversity among the state limitations catalogues,
it will be difficult for the Court to draw a single analogy to govern all
Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts causes of action. The Court in Garcia,
however, has the opportunity to blaze a trail through the analytical morass
by defining an approach by which an appropriate analogy should be
drawn. After defining that approach and enunciating the goals of the
191. 731 F.2d at 649-51.
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Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts, the Court could then allow lower federal
courts to select the state statute which best furthers those ends.
The issue could be laid to rest if Congress seized the initiative and
enacted a statute of limitations for Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts claims.
This possibility presents the ideal solution to the dilemma because certainty and national uniformity would be imposed. However, until Congress does so, any hope for analytic coherence lies with the Supreme
Court or with lower courts paying closer attention to the intent of the
Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts.

